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
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**STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE
US ARMY WAR COLLEGE
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania**

**THE SUPERPOWERS AND THE
THIRD WORLD IN THE 1980's**

by

**Robert G. Darius
and
Daniel R. Schroeder**

25 February 1981

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
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FOREWORD

This memorandum examines the Third World, an area neglected for decades in the West, which is receiving greater attention now largely as a consequence of events in the Mideast in the 1970's. The Persian Gulf and South Asia, as two of the most critical parts of the Third World, are the focal points of discussion in this paper in the context of the policies of the United States and the Soviet Union in these areas. The authors conclude that Soviet influence will expand in the Third World in the 1980's by the use of covert activities and proxies and because of the growing conventional Soviet might. However, the economic and political appeal of the Kremlin will remain limited, and these are the principal areas where the West has an advantage over the Soviet Union, provided that the West develops a credible response to counter Soviet and proxy military operations in the Third World.

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This memorandum was prepared as a contribution to the field of national security research and study. As such, it does not reflect the official view of the College, the Department of the Army, or the Department of Defense.


JACK N. MERRITT
Major General, USA
Commandant

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DR. ROBERT G. DARIUS joined the Strategic Studies Institute in 1975. He graduated from Glenville State College with a bachelor's degree in history and social sciences, earned a master's degree from the School of International Service, the American University, and a second master's degree and a doctorate in government and politics and international relations from the University of Maryland. Dr. Darius' research abroad includes several trips to the Middle East, including both sides of the Persian Gulf, and one year of field research as a research associate at the Institute for International Political and Economic Studies, Tehran, Iran. His published works include *American Diplomacy: An Options Analysis of the Azerbaijan Crisis, 1945-1946*, (1978); *Iran's Foreign Policy, 1941-1974: A Selective Bibliography*, (1976); and several articles in English and Farsi for professional journals.

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SUMMARY

The concept of the Third World, despite its ambiguity, remains a useful vehicle for separating the countries which exist outside the Western democracies (the First World) and the Soviet/Warsaw Pact (the Second World). The Third World, an area neglected for decades, received considerable attention in the West in the 1970's, largely as a result of events in the Mideast, the presence of Cubans as Soviet proxies in sub-Saharan Africa, and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

The First and the Second Worlds have high GNP per capita income and low population growth rates, while most of the Third World has low GNP per capita income and high population growth rates. All of the poorest and the most populated nations of the world belong to the Third World.

The United States, Western Europe, and Japan depend on the import of raw materials and strategic resources from the Third World for their economic prosperity. Oil and chromium are the most critical strategic resources which are of vital importance to the West. Any prolonged denial of these two strategic resources could lead to the collapse of the Western World. Both chromium and oil are located, in the largest known quantities, in sub-Saharan Africa and the Persian Gulf area respectively. The Soviet Union has so far been relatively immune to the need for imported strategic resources; however, this situation could change in the 1980's. Furthermore, many of the world's straits and chokepoints fall under the jurisdiction of Third World countries, to include the Bosphorus, Bab el Mandeb, the Suez Canal, Panama Canal, the Strait of Hormuz, and the Strait of Malacca. The air routes and the use of the sovereign airspace of some Third World countries are also of critical concern, both in times of war and peace. The land routes of some Third World countries are also important for growing overland trade. Finally, the importance of location, linked to the need for access to strategic resources, lines of communication, and access to ports and facilities, adds additional significance to selected Third World countries.

In the domestic political realm, turmoil and instability continue to plague the Third World. Many Third World leaders lack legitimacy, face serious internal threats and rising nationalism. Nationalism, Islam, socialism, democracy, and communism are the

key ideologies which dominate Third World politics. Wars, revolutions, and national liberation movements will probably increase in the 1980's. Rising urbanization will add to youth discontent. In the international arena, the Arab League, the Islamic Conference, the Organization of African Unity, the Palestine Liberation Organization, the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations as well as UN fora will be used more extensively in the 1980's by the Third World countries to influence world affairs.

Numerous challenges face the United States and the Soviet Union in the Third World in the 1980's. The principal military danger to the United States in the 1980's will be in the Persian Gulf area, where the Soviet Union is far better positioned than the United States. The endemic instability in the Caribbean area will also pose serious challenges to the United States. Soviet proxies and subversion, rather than invasion, are probably the most likely means the Soviet Union will use to reduce US influence, neutralize selected countries, and increase Soviet influence in key parts of the Third World. The United States has a few potential but reluctant proxies and several self-imposed restraints on the use of covert operations, while the Soviets appear to make full use of covert operations and proxies wherever they choose.

The United States should develop and maintain an enduring commitment toward critical parts of the Third World. It is necessary to develop a credible rapid deployment force, supported by allied and friendly forces, to deter the Soviet Union from intervening in key Third World areas. However, the principal instruments which the United States and its allies can use to their advantage are in the realm of economics and politics, where Moscow's appeal remains limited.

THE SUPERPOWERS AND THE THIRD WORLD IN THE 1980's

The Third World, neglected for decades, received considerable attention in Western media in the late 1970's, largely as a consequence of events in the Middle East, the presence of Cubans as Soviet proxies in sub-Saharan Africa, and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The Persian Gulf and South Asia, as two of the most critical parts of the Third World, were the principal focus of Western attention in 1980, and remain most vulnerable to exploitation by the Soviet Union and its proxies.

This paper defines the Third World in its broadest terms and describes its strategic, economic, and political significance to the West. The principal military threats, and economic and political challenges the West could face in parts of the Third World in the 1980's from direct Soviet military threats, Soviet proxies, and covert Soviet activities, are also analyzed. The principal economic and political challenges endemic to the Third World are considered, and finally recommendations are made for the United States, as the leader of the West, to meet the challenges and threats of the 1980's in the Third World.

CONCEPT OF THE THIRD WORLD

There is no clear, unambiguous definition of the Third World. The concept, however, is a useful vehicle for separating the countries which exist outside the Western democracies and the Soviet bloc. The Third World, broadly defined, can include Africa, the Middle East, the Indian Ocean littoral, Central and South America, and most of the nations in Southeast and Northeast Asia, plus numerous microstates in the Caribbean Sea, the Atlantic, the Indian, and the Pacific Oceans. As usual, there are exceptions to this broad categorization. For instance, Israel and South Africa fit into the category of the First World, which consists of the Western democracies, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand. The Second World consists of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact countries. China can fit both the Second and the Third World mode. Cuba plays a leading role in the Third World, despite acting as a proxy of the Soviet Union. Central America, the Caribbean, and South America are parts of the Third World, despite the historic reluctance of Brazil and Mexico, except for the past few years, to play an active role in Third World forums, because of their sensitivity toward the United States. Some analysts have added the "Fourth World" as another category, namely those countries which have little hope of attaining an industrial status, as illustrated by Bangladesh, Bhutan, Chad, and Nepal. However, these countries are usually considered parts of the Third World, and will be so considered in this paper.

The First and the Second Worlds are usually characterized by high GNP per capita income and low population growth rates, usually less than one percent per year. The Third World, on the contrary, is generally characterized by low GNP per capita income and high population growth rates, usually in excess of 2 percent per year.¹ The Third World consists of nations with vast disparities in GNP per capita income, such as Kuwait, Libya, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) with extremely high GNP per capita petrodollar incomes, in contrast to Bangladesh, Bhutan, Burma, Burundi, Chad, Comoros Island, Nepal, Sri Lanka, and numerous other nations with a GNP per capita income of less than \$200.00.² All of the poorest and the most populated nations of the world belong to the Third World. Third World nations also vary in terms of size, military capability, natural

resources, and ideological preferences. The principal common denominator among them is that they are underdeveloped, need superpower assistance, and are generally vulnerable to external penetration. Yet, there is a general Third World aspiration to maintain a distance from the superpowers.

SIGNIFICANCE OF THE THIRD WORLD

Strategic.

Resources. The United States, Western Europe, and Japan depend on the import of raw materials and strategic resources for their economic prosperity. But the United States is clearly less dependent than its allies upon many strategic resources—although the United States imports over one-third of its requirements in every commodity except aluminum and copper, Western Europe must import over two-thirds of its needs in every commodity except aluminum, iron ore, and zinc. Japan must import over 90 percent of its requirements for almost every commodity, except aluminum, lead, and zinc.³ US dependence on imports of strategic resources increased in the 1970's, a trend which is expected to continue in the 1980's and will increase US vulnerability as well. The United States and its allies are particularly vulnerable with respect to some of the following strategic resources:⁴

- Chromium. The United States depends on overseas supplies of chromium for almost 90 percent of its requirements. Chromium-bearing ores exist in large quantities in the Soviet Union, South Africa, Zimbabwe, and Turkey. The United States has in the past relied heavily on the Soviet Union and South Africa; however, the resolution of the Rhodesian crisis should reopen Zimbabwe as a principal source of chromium for the United States. Substitution opportunities for chromium are limited, but building a larger stockpile can alleviate US chromium requirements for a specific duration.

- Platinum. The US platinum requirements are met by South Africa and the Soviet Union. Platinum, like chromium, lacks a low-cost substitute.

- Iron Ore. The United States produces 70 percent of its iron ore requirements, and imports the balance from Canada, Venezuela, and other South American nations.

- Nickel. The United States imports two-thirds of its nickel

requirements; however, nickel is substitutable and can also be obtained at higher prices from seabed sources.

- **Manganese.** Almost all the US requirements for manganese are imported from Gabon and Brazil. The United States maintains a significant inventory of manganese, and can also extract manganese from seabed sources.

- **Tin.** The United States imports all its tin requirements from Malaysia, Thailand, and Bolivia. The United States maintains a 44-month strategic tin stockpile, which reduces US vulnerability to pressures from tin-producing countries.

- **Zinc.** Canada provides about one-half of the zinc requirements of the United States. The major zinc producers are Australia, Mexico, Zaire, and Zambia. Domestic US zinc production can meet US needs, if necessary, provided the price of zinc rises to a level which could make that economically feasible.

- **Natural Rubber.** Despite the vast use of synthetic rubber, natural rubber's unique physical properties make it preferable. All natural rubber requirements of the United States are imported, mostly from Malaysia and Indonesia. The United States maintains a two and one-half month stockpile of natural rubber.

- **Oil.** Oil is the most important strategic Third World resource for the West. The United States imports nearly one-half of its oil requirements, primarily from the Middle East and North Africa. Western Europe imports most of its oil requirements from the Middle East and North Africa, and Japan relies almost totally on Middle East oil. The Western World and Japan are seriously vulnerable to any prolonged denial of Middle East oil or any substantial increases in the price of oil. US dependence on imported oil has increased since 1973, and it will probably continue to increase in the 1980's. Western European and Japanese reliance on imported oil is also expected to continue, at least, at its present levels in the 1980's, if not at an expanded level. There is no real, cost-effective substitute that could replace oil as the principal source of energy for the United States and its allies in the 1980's. Therefore, any substantial increase in the demand on the world's present oil production, whether by the Western World, the Third World or the Soviet bloc could create a shortage of oil on the world market, a situation which would have serious consequences for the United States and its allies, particularly if it is prolonged. Furthermore, oil remains subject to cartel manipulation by its producers as long as the supply of oil fails to keep up with the



demand, a situation which is generally expected to hold true in the 1980's.

- **Other Resources.** The United States is heavily dependent on overseas sources for titanium, cobalt, mercury, tungsten, lead, columbium, vanadium, and fluorspar; however, all the above resources are substitutable, except for lead.

In summary, oil and chromium are two of the most critical, nonreplenishable, nonsubstitutable resources which are of vital importance to the United States, Western Europe, and Japan. Any prolonged denial of these two critical strategic resources could lead to the collapse of the Western World. Both chromium and oil are located, in the largest known quantities, in sub-Saharan Africa and in the Persian Gulf area respectively.

The Soviet Union has so far been relatively immune to the need for imported strategic resources; however, this situation could change in the 1980's. Western European and Japanese dependence on foreign sources for critical, strategic resources has grown much more rapidly than that of the United States, making these US allies extremely vulnerable to external pressure.

Lines of Communication. The sea lanes, air routes, and land lines of communication of some parts of the Third World are of critical importance to the United States and its allies.

- **Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs).** The world's sea lanes are primarily used by the major maritime powers—the United States, the Soviet Union, Western Europe, and Japan. The sea lanes of the South Atlantic, adjacent to the coastal areas of sub-Saharan Africa, are important to Western Europe and the United States, while the sea lanes of the Pacific area are Japan's main trade route. The sea lanes of the Persian Gulf, the Arabian Sea, and the Indian Ocean are the main arteries used by the United States and its allies for access to Persian Gulf oil.

Many of the world's straits and chokepoints fall under the jurisdiction of Third World countries: the Bosphorus, Bab el Mandeb, the Suez Canal, Panama Canal, the Strait of Hormuz, and the Strait of Malacca. The Panama Canal serves as the principal maritime link between the Eastern and Western coasts of the United States. The security of the Canal is of vital importance to the United States. The Bosphorus is the only outlet for the Soviet Union to the Mediterranean Sea, therefore, access through the Bosphorus is of vital concern to the Soviets. The Strait of Hormuz is the jugular vein of the Western democracies and the oil-

producing nations of the Persian Gulf area, because most of the Persian Gulf oil must pass through this relatively narrow chokepoint, regardless of the ultimate destination. The Strait of Malacca is of critical significance to Japan, because most of Japan's oil imports must go through this Strait, in addition to the Strait of Hormuz, to reach that country. The Strait of Bab el Mandeb, one of the two connecting links between the Indian Ocean, the Red Sea, and Mediterranean Sea, has become more significant since the widening of the other link (the Suez Canal) and since the substantial rise in trade in 1973 between the oil-rich Gulf states, the United States, and Western Europe. The Strait of Bab el Mandeb and the Suez Canal will remain critical chokepoints for all major maritime powers.

- Air Lines of Communication (ALOCs). The air routes of the countries of the Middle East and North Africa link the United States and the Soviet Union to the Middle East, South Asia, and Africa, as the shortest routes. The use of the Middle East/North African airspace is of critical concern to the United States, the Soviet Union and their allies, both in times of war and peace. Furthermore, the United States seeks overflight rights from Liberia through some of the nations of central sub-Saharan Africa toward the east coast of Africa for potential emergencies in the Persian Gulf area.

- Land Lines of Communication (LLOCs). The land routes among Europe, the Middle East, Asia, and Africa traverse the Middle East and North Africa, providing the historic land bridge among the three continents and the principal land routes of invaders. The Soviet Union is particularly interested in the land routes of the Persian Gulf area for direct access to the warm waters of the Indian Ocean. The land routes of the Middle East generally are important to the United States and Western Europe for growing overland trade with Africa, Asia, and the Middle East.

Location. The importance of location is linked to the need for access to strategic resources, lines of communication, ports, and facilities. The potential superpower confrontation to deny such access to each other exists, as illustrated below:

- The Soviet Union appears to pursue the Tsarist Russian objective of gaining access to the warm waters of the Persian Gulf. Iran and Pakistan are of critical importance to both the West and the Soviet Union. Together they block Soviet penetration of the oil-rich Persian Gulf area and prevent the Soviet Union from gaining a

warm water port on the Arabian Sea, needed by the Soviets for power projection and trade. Iran and Pakistan are also pivotal because of oil, the overland routes, and the air corridor which they could provide to the Soviet Union.

- Oman's importance is linked to its strategic location south of the Strait of Hormuz through which most of the oil destined for the United States and its allies must pass. Oman is also important because of its sovereignty over the Island of El Masirah, located in the Arabian Sea, which could be used by the United States as a staging base and for maritime surveillance from that island to Diego Garcia, in the middle of the Indian Ocean.

- Djibouti, with its deep, natural harbor and its location near the Strait of Bab el Mandeb is important for basing, port facilities, and naval power projection in the area. Egypt is important to all maritime powers because it controls access between the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean through the Suez Canal.

- Singapore guards the sea lanes from the Persian Gulf to Japan, while Indonesia claims control over the Strait of Malacca, and Diego Garcia provides the United States limited air and naval facilities in the Indian Ocean for surveillance of the sea lanes in that area.

- Gibraltar, Malta, and Cyprus are of strategic importance to the superpowers in the Mediterranean Sea. Dispute between the United Kingdom and Spain over Gibraltar continues. The 7-year defense treaty which allowed NATO to use Malta as a military base expired in 1979. Cyprus, with a UN peacekeeping force there, remains a principal source of tension between Greece and Turkey.

- The Caribbean area and Central America constitute the "backyard" of the United States. In the same vein, the Soviets consider the Persian Gulf and parts of South Asia as their "backyard." The difference, however, is that the Soviet Union has no real vital interest in the Caribbean or Central America except possibly the defense of its ally (Cuba), while the United States' and its allies' prosperity and survival depend on access to the oil from the Persian Gulf, which is located far away from the United States and in the Soviet "backyard."

Economic.

The Third World contains many strategic resources which remain relatively untapped. Overall, however, the Third World remains quite poor. In the mid-1970's the world's income in terms

of gross national product was divided as follows: 71 percent by Western industrial countries; 12 percent by Communist countries; and 17 percent by Third World countries. World exports in the mid-1970's were: 71 percent from the industrial West; 9 percent from the Communist countries; and 20 percent from the Third World countries.⁹ Despite these low export figures, the resource-rich countries of the Third World represent the fastest growing market for industrial exports in the world. For example, the competition among the United States, Western Europe, and Japan for a larger share of the lucrative market in the oil-rich countries of the Third World is expanding rapidly. These nations have become principal financial centers in the Third World since the quadrupling of the oil prices in 1973-74, primarily as a result of their accumulated petrodollars.

There is no illusion in the East, the West, or the Third World about the advantages which are gained through trade. The benefits of trade are enormous to all sides, and the competition for trade with Third World nations will grow in the 1980's. In this competitive atmosphere the West will probably remain far ahead of the East.

The Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) symbolizes Third World nationalism in trade with the West. OPEC was formally established in 1960 to coordinate the oil policies of its members in order to increase their influence over pricing, production and exports, and to safeguard their joint interests. Its 13 members consist of Algeria, Ecuador, Gabon, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Nigeria, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Venezuela, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). OPEC's ministerial-level conferences formulate general policy on the basis of unanimous decision. The Organization has been the only Third World cartel to achieve its objectives in its dealing with the nations of the West. It has set a precedent for Third World nations to aspire to form other cartels; however, the viability of any nonpetroleum cartel is questionable. Therefore, it is assumed that attempts to create other Third World cartels will have no success.

OPEC countries have monopolized the production of the largest portion of the world's oil supplies. As long as the demand for oil exceeds its available supply, oil prices will continue to rise, feeding into the vicious cycle of inflation on a global scale and, ultimately, eroding the purchasing power of both producers and consumers. The Third World views OPEC as a vehicle for an "equitable"

distribution of income, given the inequitable treatment that raw material, resource-producing countries have received in the past. Third World nations, like other nations, seek to maximize their gains, minimize the exploitation of their resources, and pursue their own national interests.

Political.

Instability and Change. Turmoil and instability continue to plague the Third World. The sources of instability are numerous, as illustrated below:

Most Third World leaders lack legitimacy, defined as genuine, popular support among the people and indigenous institutional support. As a result, they face serious internal threats which often emanate from heterogeneous, fragmented, traditional social structures which have failed to meet the challenges of modernization and nationalism.

Nationalism, Islam, and socialism are the principal ideologies which dominate Third World politics. Nationalism is the most virulent ideology in the Third World. Communism and Soviet subversion remain serious threats to some Third World nations, while various brands of socialism, Islamic rule, and military dictatorships are the principal existing forms of government in most of the Third World.

The heavy emphasis in the United States on democratic versus Communist models of development for the Third World, as two completely separate alternatives, has dominated US policy and academic thought. India and China usually represent these two models respectively. Yet, many Third World nations appear to be less concerned with the distinct characteristics of the two models rather than their overlaps, seeking to choose what is best for themselves from both models and aspiring to defuse the ideological emphasis placed by Washington and Moscow on the paths to development. The Islamic reawakening offers another model of change—an alternative which may ultimately prove to be more palatable than either the democratic or the Communist models.

Islam is a vital unquenchable force—a politico-religious ideology deeply embedded in political and cultural aspects of life in the Islamic countries of the Third World. The reawakening, revitalization, and rededication of Muslims to the puritanic tenets and purposes of Islam have made it the most dynamic ideology in Islamic nations, an ideology which appears to overshadow, ignore,

or cast aside the relevance of Communist or democratic models. Islam as an ideology has been reawakened as a result of Muslim Third World frustrations and perceptions of Soviet atheism and Western "decadence and materialism." Neither superpower could gain enduring influence in the Islamic Third World without coming to terms with the fundamental aspirations of its people, including the resurgence of Islamic fundamentalism, as well as the frustrations concerning perceived superpower exploitation and penetration.

Communism and Islam are basically antithetical because Communists are atheists and Muslims are monotheists. However, the Third World, in general, is not impervious to Soviet subversion and indigenous Communist movements. Communism in the Islamic parts of the Third World has little mass appeal, but, as elsewhere, some intellectuals and elites see communism as an answer to the socioeconomic and political ills of backward, traditional societies. Furthermore, both Communist and Muslim revolutionaries are anti-Western. The gulf between traditional cultures of the Third World and the Communist societies is too wide to be bridged easily. In contrast, the relative gap between the Third World and the democratic West appears to be less.

There is a natural determination in many Third World countries to demonstrate greater independence from both the United States and the Soviet Union, and to reject democratic or Communist systems and values. Is it possible for the Third World to pursue such a policy, without incurring disadvantages from such a relationship with one or both of the superpowers? For instance, the countries of the Persian Gulf area have found themselves in an increasingly painful dilemma between their aspirations to minimize superpower presence, and the need to grudgingly allow a US presence to deter Soviet actions in that area. The attitudes of the leaders of Pakistan, Oman, and Saudi Arabia toward superpower presence in the area will be influenced by the dilemma of pursuing their national interests independent of Washington on the one hand and preventing any external "hegemony" on the other, and ensuring that the Soviet Union is deterred by the United States from marching southward into the Persian Gulf area.

Separatist movements, liberation organizations, and independence movements are numerous in the Third World. The threats of violence and unrest from extremists, both Muslim and Communist, as well as separatists, are political facts of life which

are most conducive to continued instability in much of the Third World.

Wars, revolutions, and national liberations will probably increase in the Third World in the 1980's. The Soviet Union will probably continue to fuel such sources of tension. Revolutionary movements in the Third World will most likely be against both the West and East, a phenomenon which will force many Third World nations to maintain a distance from both Washington and Moscow—a situation which must be patiently faced by the superpowers in the context of their own national interests, and preferably in the setting of the national interests of such Third World nations.

Urbanization in Baghdad, Bombay, Cairo, Jakarta, and other major cities of the Third World continues unabated, primarily as a result of the massive migration of the youth from rural areas in search of job, opportunity, or education. As a result, urban areas have become centers of revolution and the urbanized, discontented Third World youths are the principal supporters of radical, leftist, socialist, or indigenous Muslim political movements. Poverty, illiteracy, maldistribution of wealth and other economic ills are also endemic. They remain the principal economic causes of internal instability in the Third World.

International and Regional Organizations. The majority of UN member states are from the Third World. In addition, several Third World organizations send representatives to UN meetings. These organizations include the Arab League, the Islamic Conference, and the Organization of African Unity (OAU). Third World member states play a crucial role in the UN General Assembly in particular.

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) was formed in 1967 after several attempts at regional cooperation in the 1950's and early 1960's. Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand are ASEAN's members. ASEAN has become an important center for interaction and policy coordination among its members.

The Organization of African Unity was founded in 1963 to promote cooperation and unity among African states, and to end colonialism and neocolonialism in Africa. Its 49 members include the nations of North Africa, sub-Saharan Africa, and some of the insular states of the Indian Ocean. OAU supports liberation movements in Africa, and provides both financial and military aid

to African nationalist movements which seek to attain their independence. It is an influential political organization in Africa. OAU bridges the Middle East, North Africa, sub-Saharan Africa, and some of the Indian Ocean states.

The League of Arab States is an association consisting of 22 members including the Palestine Liberation Organization. Most of its members are Mideast and North African states; however, Djibouti, Mauritania, Somalia, and Sudan are also members. The League is an influential political body which serves Arab and some African nations in political, educational, cultural, and financial areas as an instrument of integration in the Arab and Muslim countries of the Middle East, North and sub-Saharan Africa. As such the League bridges Africa and the Mideast.

The Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC) was established in 1968, as a vehicle to promote cooperation among Arab oil producers. OAPEC members include Algeria, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates, which are also members of OPEC; however, OAPEC also includes Bahrain and Syria, which are non-OPEC members. Egypt was expelled from OAPEC in April 1979 because of its bilateral peace treaty with Israel. In general, OAPEC policies are parallel with those of OPEC; however, in specific settings, OAPEC supports political and economic objectives of the Arab oil producers, including issues relating to the Arab-Israeli crisis and Arab oil embargoes. For instance, the Arab oil embargo of 1973-74 was achieved by OAPEC consensus. OAPEC is an important political instrument which may be used by the Arabs in the future, as it was done in 1973-74.

The nonaligned movement began in 1955 at Bandung and was formalized at Belgrade in 1961. A global political, social, and economic movement representing nearly a billion people and over 100 states, it influences world affairs by its role in numerous international and regional organizations. The movement, which began as an anticolonialist movement, is the most important Third World organization. It seeks a new political and economic order, and exhorts the superpowers to avoid a nuclear war. The search for a new international economic order, as a means to rectify the economic imbalance between the rich "north" and the poor "south," is one of the principal economic demands of the nonaligned movement.

THE SUPERPOWERS AND THE THIRD WORLD: POTENTIAL THREATS AND CHALLENGES IN THE 1980's

Assumptions.

- The West and the Soviet bloc will become more dependent on the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries' members for oil by the mid-1980's. The Soviet bloc will become an importer, rather than exporter of oil. US dependence on imported oil will also rise in the 1980's.
- This increased dependence on imported oil will lead to greater tension between the two blocs, and may result in a direct US-USSR confrontation or, more likely, in "proxy" warfare and covert activities involving the Soviet Union in the oil-rich parts of the Third World.
- Western European and Japanese economic growth will probably continue to be higher than that of the United States. Such a trend will increase economic rivalry between the United States and its allies in the 1980's.
- The potentials for war in the European or the Pacific theater appear less than in resource-rich Third World areas, particularly those on the periphery of the Soviet Union which are extremely vulnerable to direct Soviet military overtures, because the West lacks the conventional forces and the united resolve necessary to deter the Soviets in such areas in the 1980's.

Threats and Challenges.

The greater the Soviet perception of freedom of action in the military realm, the greater the danger that they might attempt to exert the leverage of military power (threatened or used) in extending their economic, diplomatic, or ideological influence.*

General David C. Jones, USAF

Military. As Zbigniew Brezezinski pointed out, the "post-Vietnam era" is over.⁷ In early 1980, discussions in the United States revolved around force deployment, escalation, Soviet moves, US countermoves, deterrence, and warfighting focusing on the "arc of crisis" in the Third World—the Persian Gulf and the Arabian Peninsula, Afghanistan, and Pakistan.

General David C. Jones, USAF, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, offers two alternatives to the growing Soviet military capability in the *United States Military Posture for FY 1980*. The first alternative is to show restraint. Based on past US efforts, he thinks the Soviet Union will again ignore US restraint. The second alternative is to rely on US capability and willingness to face the Soviet Union in any buildup, which General Jones believes could force the Soviet Union to reconsider its massive emphasis on the military. In addition, General Jones makes an appeal for a "more confident and assertive national strategy."⁸

In light of the enunciation of the Carter Doctrine to defend vital Western interests in the Persian Gulf area against any outside force by the use of military force if necessary, the US military capability to meet a Soviet thrust in this area, which is far from the United States and adjacent to the Soviet Union, must be evaluated. In a Brookings Institution study, entitled *Setting National Priorities: Agenda for the 1980's*, William W. Kaufmann, a consultant to Former Secretary of Defense Harold Brown, states that the principal danger to the United States in the 1980's will be in the Persian Gulf area, because the Soviet Union has the advantage of being "far better positioned" than the United States and its allies.⁹ Kaufmann contends that the United States should concentrate on improving its conventional capabilities and should "drop the pretense that nuclear weapons will somehow extricate the United States from the confrontations and hazards of the future" because in the Persian Gulf area nuclear weapons are of little, if any, use.¹⁰ Others maintain that Western access to Persian Gulf oil is in greater danger from another Arab-Israeli or Iranian-Iraqi war than from an overt Soviet attack in the Persian Gulf, and there is a great deal of validity in this position as well.

The Soviet Union, within a few weeks, could send more than 100,000 troops toward the Persian Gulf oilfields.¹¹ But such an invasion would probably encounter fierce local resistance, and the United States could use "fighter-bombers from aircraft carriers in the Indian Ocean against Soviet forces and . . . about 25,000 Army and Marine troops could be sent to the Persian Gulf within about two weeks."¹² In addition, several improvements such as the development of a new transport plane called CX, the deployment of a new fleet of cargo ships in the Indian Ocean, and the expansion of base facilities at Diego Garcia together with increased US access to other bases and facilities in the region should enable the United

States to send over 100,000 heavily-armed troops into the Persian Gulf area within 30 days by 1985. Simultaneously, Western European nations and friendly nations of the Persian Gulf are also expected to increase their defense roles in the region.¹³ Together, such a joint effort could deter the Soviet Union in the 1980's.

The Caribbean states are located in an area of vital concern to the United States. It is in the US national interest to prevent the Soviet Union and its proxies from exploiting endemic instability in order to fuel upheavals to establish Communist regimes in the Caribbean area. The small, vulnerable states of the Caribbean area should be assisted by the United States to develop themselves, to resist subversion, and to deny the Soviet Union and Cuba the opportunity to fuel upheavals or to use their ports and facilities.

Most of the small Third World nations are vulnerable to penetration by larger regional powers and to subversion by the Soviet Union and its proxies. The reliance of these small states on major regional powers, major external powers, or on one of the superpowers for protection from external threats will continue in the 1980's. Furthermore, many Third World states must rely on the "good will" of the superpowers to ensure their survival. This inherent vulnerability can inevitably invite superpower penetration and exploitation.

The United States will probably continue to retain a dominant position in the Trust Territories of the Pacific Ocean in the 1980's. The Soviet Union, however, will seek access to some facilities or bases in the Pacific. Some of the small, insular states of the Pacific Ocean can provide or deny the use of air and naval facilities to the Soviet Union—Western Samoa and Tonga rejected the Soviet proposal to permit a Soviet fishing fleet to base on these two islands. The US Trust Territories of the Pacific Islands, American Samoa, French Polynesia, and Guam will probably continue to lie outside the sphere of US-Soviet rivalry. Most of the other Third World microstates will probably remain neutral or pro-Western.

Economic. The fracture of the postwar international system in the 1970's took place largely because of the process of "withdrawal" of the United States from the center stage in international economic policy in the early 1960's. The system has yet to be mended or replaced.¹⁴ In the 1980's, the Third World wishes to play a significant role in the formulation of a new international economic order. The Soviet bloc relies largely on

barter as its principal method of trade, and rejects the postwar international economic system.

The Third World also rejects the system and has never accepted its rules. It sees this system as "one developed by the West for its own benefit. In effect, the Third World feels that there are no rules by which [it] is . . . bound in the reception of foreign investment, the gestation of international trade, and the formation of material policy."¹⁵

Furthermore, serious reductions in Third World oil production are possible in the 1980's. Saudi Arabia, the largest OPEC oil producer, could lower its production from 9.5 million barrels a day to around 7 million barrels a day, because the income from 9.5 million barrels a day is "far above" Saudi needs, and their internal needs could be met comfortably with 7 million barrels a day.¹⁶ The additional Saudi production probably takes place as an incentive to resolve the Palestinian problem, and because Saudi Arabia needs Western technology and expects the United States to defend the Persian Gulf area against Soviet intrusions.

The disparities in wealth between small, rich upper classes and vast, poor lower classes will remain the principal economic source of instability in most Third World societies. The potential for disputes over the distribution of goods will threaten the fragile internal stability that exists in many Third World societies. Many Third World leaders will not be able to cope with the rising demands from their masses for a redistribution of wealth.

Nation-building in traditional societies is a particularly complex and perplexing task, requiring patience, ingenuity, time, and a great deal of coordinated effort. It is a multidimensional process, involving political change, economic growth, modernization, and the consolidation of change in an institutionalized fashion. Such a process is filled with obstacles and potentials for instability, a fact which is clearly recognized by Western and indigenous students of nation-building. As the process of nation-building gains momentum, the superpowers should continue to reevaluate their policies in order to fulfill their own national interests and to assist Third World nations in their nation-building efforts.

The linkages between domestic and external policies of the superpowers will probably also grow in the 1980's. Both Moscow and Washington realize that their domestic and foreign policies must be evaluated on the basis of a complex interrelationship between domestic and external variables. For instance, US fiscal,

monetary, farm, and anti-inflationary policies may also be linked to a greater extent with international affairs, as the level of economic competition for access to the limited resources grows.

In the international economic arena, the United States, as the leader of the West, must take substantial initiatives to increase international coordination in the West in commerce and trade, and to encourage Third World trade with the West, on mutually agreeable terms.

Political. President Carter's foreign policy efforts included the Camp David Accord as a step toward peace in the Mideast; the diplomatic recognition of China and the growing realization of the role of China in the global strategic equation; a creative African policy which prevented bloodshed in Zimbabwe and allowed for a peaceful settlement of the complex issues involved in that country; and the introduction of human rights policy which contributed to the downfall of the Shah, a staunch ally of the United States.

The implementation of the Egyptian-Israeli peace initiative has led to the exchange of ambassadors, limited opened borders and air service, and some trade and tourism. These relations can only expand if the complex issues surrounding the Palestinian people are also resolved. Without Egypt, the other Arab states cannot wage a successful war against Israel. As a result, Israel's survival is no longer at stake. Yet, the state of tension will continue as long as the Palestinian issue remains unresolved.

The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) overtures in Western Europe have led to growing indication that Europe will pursue Mideast peace initiatives aimed at self-determination for the Palestinians, while the United States supports a limited form of self-government under an autonomy plan. The pressures for self-determination will continue to grow in the 1980's, possibly leading to new, heightened peace interactions among the United States, Israel, and the Arabs, a process which may eventually resolve the key Palestinian issues which are the core of the Mideast dispute.¹⁷

Soviet proxies and subversion, rather than invasion, are probably the most likely way for the Soviet Union to reduce US influence, neutralize selected countries, and increase Second World influence in key parts of the Third World. The United States has a few potential but reluctant proxies and has several self-imposed restraints on the use of covert operations, while the Soviet Union appears to make full use of covert operations and proxies wherever it so chooses. A Presidential Executive Order issued in January

1978 governed the operation of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), reflecting the so-called Hughes-Ryan Amendment to the Foreign Aid Authorization Act of 1974. The Hughes-Ryan law resulted in the system in which "several members of several congressional committees oversee the intelligence community."¹⁸ And the 1978 Executive Order stated that the President would keep the congressional committees "fully and currently informed" on covert intelligence operations.¹⁹ The United States should check covert Soviet activities and expand US efforts to gain allied, friendly nations' support to halt the further introduction of Soviet proxies in key parts of the Third World.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The United States has continually asserted and reasserted its commitments in NATO and Northeast Asia. Similarly, it should develop and maintain an enduring commitment to defend critical parts of the Third World. Leadership, constancy, consistency, and endurance must characterize US policy if the United States expects to lead the West in key parts of the Third World. Otherwise, America could lose influence among its Third World friends.

President Carter moved closer to an evenhanded approach in US policy toward the Arabs and Israelis than any other president. On balance, he also brought the two sides closer to peace than any other president. The US commitment to an evenhanded policy in the Arab-Israeli crisis must be continued, along with the commitment to bring a just, enduring, and comprehensive peace. Preferably, this commitment should be bipartisan but, in reality, it probably will not work out that way.

Many Third World nations view the United States as an indecisive giant, without credibility. Flexing US military might without having the conventional force capability necessary to deter the Soviets in the Third World is dangerous. It is necessary to build a credible rapid deployment force with airlift and sealift capabilities, linked with a network of existing base rights, air and sea facilities, in cooperation with allied nations to deter and, if necessary, face the Soviets in the Persian Gulf area and other selected parts of the Third World. The role of armor in a rapid deployment force of about 150,000 men must be clarified with the objective of providing the greatest warfighting capability to deter a Soviet attack in the Third World. Presumably, both Army and

Marine Corps mechanized and armored units will be used, but the mix, type, and numbers of Army or Navy forces; type of equipment to be used and the command/communications; and other similar issues must be resolved, if a credible rapid deployment force is to be established.

Admiral Bigley, Commander, NATO's Inter-Allied Striking Fleet Atlantic, has said that one quick way to get more naval power is to overhaul "one or more World War II-vintage battleships of the New Jersey type and the old aircraft Carrier Oriskany" According to Admiral Bigley, these battleships are "super platforms. They're hardly sinkable. They've got about 15 years more life in them. But they've got to be modified."²⁰ The US Navy must expand its shipbuilding, such as the Aegis air defense cruisers and the Spruance-class destroyers, in order to balance what Admiral Thomas Hayward, Chief of Naval Operations, calls a "three-ocean commitment with a one-and-a-half ocean navy."²¹

The use of sea and air power to fight limited conventional wars with limited objectives is the backbone of any US capability to deter conflicts in the Third World. Yet, its success largely hinges upon cooperation and support from local forces, without which there is little chance to deter or halt a Soviet-led or directed aggression in the Third World. Any Third World nation faced by a direct Soviet attack would probably cooperate with the United States, provided that its leadership had not already become the victim of covert Soviet actions and internal political changes. Herein lies the need for a capable, credible US role to balance such Soviet activities in the Third World.

Wisdom, prudence, perseverance, and understanding are required in the West, in order to develop an enduring relationship with the Third World. The development of a conventional force to deter and prevent the Soviet Union and its allies from using a military option is also required to show the Third World that First World resolve exists and to show the Kremlin that the capability to face its military threat is available and ready.

The United States should continue to seek the active participation of selected Third World nations, on the basis of mutual interests, to face the Soviet threat in the 1980's.

In theory, it is in the US interest to seek to defuse superpower rivalry in the Persian Gulf and South Asia, where the United States and its allies have vital interests, and to prevent the expansion of the Soviet foothold in the Caribbean and South American-Western

Hemisphere areas which have traditionally been parts of the US sphere of influence. The United States should also continue to contribute to nation-building, the maintenance of regional stability, and the reduction of superpower rivalry in other areas such as sub-Saharan Africa, the Indian Ocean, and the Middle East. In practice, however, such a policy may be difficult to attain as long as the Soviet Union pursues an offensive military policy.

In conclusion, Soviet influence in the Third World in the 1980's will probably expand by its covert activities, by the growing conventional Soviet military capability to project its power, and by the use of proxies. The economic and political appeal of the Kremlin will remain limited in most of the Third World, and these are the principal instruments which the West can use to its advantage, provided that the West develops and maintains a credible response to covert Soviet activities, potential Soviet military interventions, and the use of proxies.

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political appeal of the Kremlin will remain limited, and these are the principal areas where the West has an advantage over the Soviet Union, provided that the West develops a credible response to counter Soviet military operations in the Third World.

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